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March 31,
2005
Secrecy Culture Continues
By Don Bauder
SanDiegoReader.com
"Why
would [city bureaucrats]
knowingly want to overstate
their assets?"
asks Scott Barnett, former
head of the San Diego
County Taxpayers
Association. "The
sewer and water systems
are self-sustaining.
They can
raise revenue with the
vote of city council."
But, says Barnett,
more than $100 million
has been squirreled
out of sewer
and water to bulk
up the general fund
over the past decade.
You can easily say
that $100 million
is equivalent to
100 miles of sewer
and water pipe."
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A letter that has fallen into the Reader's
hands reveals that the City of San Diego
will have to confess many more accounting
sins once it gets new audits from outside
firms poring over its books. The city's
assets have been inflated and liabilities
deflated far more than citizens or bondholders
have yet been told. The big question:
is it felony stupid? Or felony, period?
Among many things, the letter reveals
that for 2002, net assets of the wastewater
department were overstated by $161 million,
or 9 percent of net assets (total assets
minus liabilities, mainly debt). During
the same year, net assets of the water
system were overstated by $52 million,
or 5 percent. Background interviews reveal
that an inexplicable and unacceptable
accounting practice has led to the overstatement,
and this incorrect method has been used
in other city departments, too. Therefore,
more big writedowns are coming.
In September of 2003, pension-board
whistle-blower Diann Shipione challenged
the veracity of a prospectus covering
half a billion dollars of sewer bonds.
The city canceled the offering. In January
and March of 2004, the city confessed
for the first time that it had been putting
inaccurate information in bond prospectuses
dating back to 1996.
But as the letter makes clear, you ain't
seen nothin' yet.
The January 19, 2005, letter to city
manager P. Lamont Ewell was written by
John McNally of Hawkins Delafield & Wood,
Washington, D.C., an outside bond counsel.
In essence, he tells Ewell that the city
doesn't have to confess its newly discovered
accounting sins until it has a certified
audit. It is not necessary to file another
mea culpa using unaudited financial statements.
In the middle of the letter he points
out the $161 million and $52 million
net-asset overstatements. He notes that
the Securities and Exchange Commission
has in the past charged securities-law
violations over much smaller numbers.
For example, Syracuse was charged with
disseminating false information in 1997
when it said its general fund was $400,000
in surplus when it was actually $9.4
million in deficit.
In addition, McNally states, "The
2002 financial statements contained numerous
errors" (in addition to those reported
in early 2004). He adds, "The initial
drafts of the 2003 water and wastewater
financials and related notes have undergone
substantial revisions" because of
comments by KPMG, the major accounting
firm that refuses to release 2003 and
2004 audits until it is satisfied that
it is getting straight information. The
letter also states that KPMG has questions
about accounting for so-called "employee
offset," or the city's practice
of paying a portion of employees' contribution
to the pension fund.
The city will only say that the assets
will have to be written down because
KPMG prefers a different accounting methodology.
Shipione has learned, and I have confirmed
through background interviews, that the
net-asset overstatements come mainly
from the use of an accounting technique
that has accounting pros scratching and
shaking their heads. For some time, the
wastewater and water departments -- and
other city departments -- have begun
depreciating assets after the final bill
for the asset has been paid, rather than
as soon as it goes into service. That's
a little like not buying car insurance
until you have paid off the car, rather
than when you start driving it. Companies
and governments take regular bookkeeping
charges to write off the cost of an asset
over its estimated useful life. It is
not a cash outlay; funds are not set
aside. But delaying depreciation charges
inflates the asset's stated value.
"You begin depreciation when the
asset is put in service," says Carl
Johnson of the Governmental Accounting
Standards Board in Norwalk, Connecticut. "I
don't know any reason why the [installment]
financing of the asset would delay the
start of depreciation." Governments
handle the accounting move the same way
companies do, he says.
"It's a pretty fundamental accounting
principle: you begin depreciating an
asset when it is placed in service," says
San Diego accountant April Boling, who
is active in Republican politics. "The
time of paying off that asset doesn't
have anything to do with it."
"I can't believe their auditors
would let them do that," says John
Patrick Ford, retired partner from the
firm now named PricewaterhouseCoopers.
This depreciation technique really defies
the purpose of depreciation, say these
accounting pros. So what explains the
city's use of it? Stupidity? Something
sinister? "Why would [city bureaucrats]
knowingly want to overstate their assets?" asks
Scott Barnett, former head of the San
Diego County Taxpayers Association. "The
sewer and water systems are self-sustaining.
They can raise revenue with the vote
of city council."
But, says Barnett, more than $100 million
has been squirreled out of sewer and
water to bulk up the general fund over
the past decade. "You can easily
say that $100 million is equivalent to
100 miles of sewer and water pipe."
Bond investors generally look to see
if a municipality has the cash flow to
service the debt. They are not so interested
in assets.
However, there is a reason for a government
to inflate assets. "Borrowing capacity
goes up as assets go up," notes
Shipione. "Higher assets give the
appearance of a lot of debt capacity
-- a false sense of liquidity."
This asset inflation is just one problem
to which the city will have to 'fess
up. "The city's financials will
have to be severely restated," says
Shipione. "You see it over and over
again: artificial inflation of assets
and diminishment of liabilities. This
example of depreciation will be shown
to be only one of many abuses that have
infiltrated the city's financial reports."
"Numbers like this can't be a bureaucratic
mistake," says former councilmember
Bruce Henderson. "These are the
sorts of numbers that suggest a massive
cover-up."
"It's not in keeping with proper
financial management. It's clear and
convincing evidence of securities fraud.
They have not only cooked the books on
liabilities, but now they are significantly
overstating assets," says Carl DeMaio,
president of the Performance Institute,
a private think tank promoting government
efficiency. "The city should return
those awards they got for financial management
in the 1990s."
"It raises questions of auditor
incompetence," says councilmember
Donna Frye, who is the most knowledgeable
councilperson on sewer and water issues.
However, until I called her, she had
only heard about the matter in a passing
reference in one committee meeting. Like
Henderson and DeMaio, she believes the
local government should inform the citizens
in some way of such problems, even though
it is not making the specifics known
to capital markets yet. "This culture
of secrecy continues. It's so deeply
rooted. We heard this constant mantra
that we were the best-run city, but it
was a story that included a lot of smoke
and mirrors."
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